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Representing "The Peoples"?

Post-neoliberal states in the international climate negotiations

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Abstract: In recent years, the post-neoliberal bloc of Latin America countries, ALBA, has fashioned a role for itself in international climate change negotiations as representing the voice of ‘the peoples’. In this article I draw on innovative theorising of representation to critically examine this claim. I argue that although ALBA has sought to construct a constituency based on the malleable notion of ‘the people’, its function is better understood as ‘discursive representation’, and specifically as representation of Green Radical discourses. Such forms of representation are potentially important in global governance given the challenges of capturing the interests of all affected parties. I critically evaluate this case of discursive representation in terms of its rhetorical efficacy; accountability; and legitimacy. Although certain favourable elements emerge from this evaluation, this case also points to the potential hazards of transmitting a public discourse through a state-based representative in multilateral settings.

Key words: representation, global governance, discourse, climate change

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1. Introduction[i]

For years to come, the 2009 Copenhagen climate change summit will be remembered as a spectacular failure: in spite of an unprecedented level of concern and the presence of more than one hundred heads of government, the international community failed to produce a new treaty (or even a political agreement) to limit global warming. The alleged reasons for this are numerous: China's intransigence, the United States' miniscule targets, the European Union's waning influence, and the Danish host's fumbling diplomacy. Despite these and other factors, the Copenhagen Accord would have carried more weight had its adoption not been thwarted by a small number of states in the summit's final hours. Derisively dismissed by some as the 'Weird Left'[ii] and the 'Marxists from the Mountains',[iii] several post-neoliberal Latin American states (together with Tuvalu and Sudan) denounced the Accord on procedural and substantive grounds. For these states, and many within civil society, Copenhagen will be remembered quite differently: the failure to reach agreement may be lamentable, but no agreement is preferable to an insufficient or ecologically irrational one. In this article, I look beyond sardonic dismissals and impatient accusations of blocking progress to critically assess the role of the post-neoliberal bloc, ALBA, in multilateral climate negotiations. Led by Bolivian President Evo Morales, in 2009 and 2010 the core members of ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America)[iv] fashioned a role for themselves as the voice of the 'the peoples' in climate negotiations. The weak status of the Copenhagen Accord has thereby been presented as a victory of the peoples (Morales, 2010c). Such a claim by a state to represent people beyond its own sovereign borders is rare, perhaps unprecedented, in international politics. My objective in this article is to critically examine this post-sovereign 'representative claim' (Saward, 2010) and assess its democratic legitimacy. In the first section, I present an overview of the concept of representation and its relevance for issues of global governance, such as climate change. I argue that although ALBA has sought to construct a constituency based on the malleable notion of 'the people', its function is better understood as 'discursive representation' (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008), and specifically as representation of a Green Radical class of discourse. I then contextualise Green Radicalism by locating it within the broader discursive landscape of global climate governance. Section four then introduces the post-neoliberal alliance, ALBA, and its contribution to multilateral climate negotiations. Here I highlight that at the Copenhagen Summit, ALBA governments stepped up their efforts to publicise their positions and connect with social movements and

activists from around the world. This presents a potentially positive opportunity for enhancing the representation of a marginal class of discourse, which has both normative and rational value. Section five evaluates ALBA’s representation by assessing whether the rhetoric employed is appropriate; whether they have made themselves accountable to those they aim to represent; and whether their representative claim is perceived as legitimate by others articulating Green Radicalism.

2. Representation in global governance

As the environmental, social, and economic effects of actions are now rarely contained within national borders, internationally negotiated and coordinated actions are necessary. Nevertheless, this scaling-up of authority poses considerable challenges for democratic legitimacy. The implausibility of translating the ‘all-affected principle’ into direct participation at the global level renders representation a necessary element of global governance. Representation is typically assumed to take the form of a principal-agent relationship located within an electorally and territorially defined setting (Urbinati and Warren, 2008: 389). Defining its parameters, Pitkin writes:

> representing… means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them. The representative must act independently; his action must involve discretion and judgment; he must be the one who acts. The represented must also be (conceived as) capable of independent action and judgment, not merely being taken care of. And, despite the resulting potential for conflict between representative and represented about what is to be done, that conflict must not normally take place. The representative must act in such a way that there is no conflict, or if it occurs an explanation is called for. He must not be found persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented without good reason in terms of their interest, without good explanation of why their wishes are not in accord with their interest (1967: 209-10).

Such relations of representation are increasingly formed in non-electoral and de-territorialised settings. In multilateral settings, state-based representation exists alongside a range of other self-authorised representatives from civil society and professional organisations, including national and transnational advocacy organisations and interest groups. The constituents of self-authorised representatives may be defined on the basis of gender, ethnicity, race, profession, and even species. These relations may be ongoing or established to achieve an immediate, short-term, objective. This ‘constructed’ nature of relations of representation is perhaps most clearly elucidated in Saward’s recent conceptualisation of representation as a dynamic, performative *process* of claim making (2006, 2010). From this perspective, representation does not simply occur when an individual or group steps in to act for a

collective with pre-given shared interests and identities. Relationships of representation do not emerge organically. Instead, Saward argues, constituencies are constructed in the process of making a representative claim: 'a claim to represent or to know what represents the interests of someone or something. It invokes … claims that one stands for others by virtue of roles one can play' (2010: 42-43). There are five elements to a representative claim: 'A **maker** of representations (**M**) puts forward a **subject** (**S**) which stands for an **object** (**O**) which is related to a **referent** (**R**) and is offered to an **audience** (**A**) (Saward, 2006: 302). Illustrative is the following: Alejandro Hitcher (Venezuela's environment minister) (**maker**) offers ALBA (subject) as a mouthpiece of 'the peoples' (**object**) to the UNFCCC[v] (**audience**). The referent here is 'the actual, flesh-and-blood' peoples (ibid), which could be interpreted and portrayed in different ways.[vi] Below I argue that ALBA (led by Bolivian President Evo Morales) has actively constructed a constituency of "the peoples" based on a Green Radical class of discourse. The notion of "the people" is particularly malleable; in Canovan's assessment it has become 'potent but hazy' but is best understood as a 'legitimating myth' due to the sense of authority it implies (2006: 353).

If, as I argue, the voice of 'the peoples' that ALBA has made their own is that of a discursively defined constituency, then ALBA's actions are best understood as 'discursive representation' (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). There are two advantages to such an understanding. First, it is more sincere articulation of what is actually being represented, which is a discourse rather than a universal "peoples". And, second, such an understanding may serve the UNFCCC more broadly. The legitimacy of this regime depends, *inter alia*, on the perceived inclusivity of its representation, which may be fruitfully sought in the representation of discourses. Despite extensive civil society presence in the UNFCCC, states based representation remains the norm in international climate negotiations. Yet, this is a weak form of capturing the interests and preferences of all potentially affected persons, which may differ from the national interests of the states in which they find themselves. Inclusive representation may instead be secured via representation of climate discourses, which are numerous but finite (Dryzek and Stevenson 2011). Discourse here is understood as 'a set of categories and concepts embodying specific assumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions, and capabilities. It enables the mind to process sensory inputs into coherent accounts, which can then be shared in intersubjectively meaningful fashion' (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008: 481). Discursive representation, Dryzek and Niemeyer persuasively argue, can be justified on grounds of rationality, ontology, and ethics. As pluralists have long

argued, a decision will be more rational if it is subject to criticism from a range of positions. Such positions are best sought in the more solid and measurable concept of discourse rather than fluid perspectives or opinions. Their ontological justification rests on the recognition that individual subjectivity emerges from multiple discourses. As a consequence, a person cannot be fully represented by any single representative; holistic representation requires representatives for the multiple discourses that people inhabit. This recognition also informs their ethical justification: individual liberty is repressed if individuals are treated as ‘unproblematic wholes’ who ought to filter aspects of their subjectivity prior to seeking representation (ibid.: 482-84). Consequently, to the extent that potentially affected people embody a discourse of Green Radicalism, there are pragmatic, rational, and ethical reasons to promote its representation in climate negotiations.

3. Discourses of Global Climate Change[vii]

The expanding breadth of the climate change agenda has been accompanied by a growing range of engaged actors, and consequently an increasing number of climate discourses. Inclusive representation in global climate governance requires identifying publicly expressed discourses. Elsewhere, Dryzek and Stevenson (2011) present an exercise in capturing the range and pattern of such discourses through analysis of the side event program at the Copenhagen climate summit, in 2009.[viii] We argued that climate governance discourses in the global public sphere can be classified on two dimensions: one broadly economic and the other broadly political. The economic orientation can be understood as either reformist or radical in relation to the parameters of the existing liberal international economic system. Reformists accept these basic parameters. From a radical perspective, existing economic objectives and values are themselves deeply implicated in the problem of climate change and ought to be the focus of more transformative action. The political orientation of climate discourses can be understood as either conservative or progressive. The conservative position envisages that strategies to address climate change will be designed and enacted within the parameters of existing institutions and power structures. The progressive position is that the existing distribution of power is inadequate and inappropriate. Authority for designing and enacting strategies should thus be shared with, or transferred to, presently disempowered actors at global, national, or local levels. Four classes of discourse are captured in the following typology:



Source: (Dryzek and Stevenson 2011)

For the purpose of this article, I am concerned only with the representation of the economically radical and politically progressive class of discourse, Green Radicalism. A common assumption in Green Radical discourses is that addressing climate change requires a fundamental reorientation of economic behaviour and development models. Material growth on an infinite and universal scale simply cannot be reconciled with a safe climate and sustainable order. Such economic changes demand a redistribution of power away from presently dominant authorities. Concerns relating to human rights, justice, and equity tend to be highly salient in these discourses, and hierarchically superior to short-term economic concerns. Attention is directed towards addressing the structural causes of climate change, which are political and economic in nature. Diversity emerges within Green Radicalism in identifying the most relevant structural causes of climate change and/or providing an alternative vision for society. Our analysis pointed to three distinct discourses in this class.[ix]

Ecofeminism rejects the assumption that effective and appropriate responses to climate change can be designed within existing institutions. Climate injustice and gender injustice are connected and ought to be confronted simultaneously. The patriarchal ordering of national and international institutions is largely responsible for imposing both types of injustice. Existing governance arrangements tend to marginalise women and their concerns and experiences, including their increased vulnerability to both climate change and mitigation measures (MacGregor, 2010). Adequately responding to the challenges posed by climate change requires a fundamental transformation of existing patriarchal institutions.

Radical decentralisation "small is beautiful", identifies the structural cause of climate change as an institutionalised model of development that privileges industrial-scale production. Responding effectively to the challenges presented by climate change requires replacing this inherently ecologically and socially unsustainable model with small and local scale production. Community-level development, mitigation, and adaptation can better respond to the needs of people and the environment because, unlike industrial-scale development, it is not exclusively directed towards generating profit but rather towards ensuring the welfare of a clearly defined group of people. Carbon markets and emissions offsetting are rejected because these mechanisms shift responsibility and accountability away from the local level. Decision-making processes also need to be de-centralised to allow for genuine participation by marginalised and affected peoples, including local communities and indigenous peoples.

New globalism affirms that an effective and just response to climate change will only be possible if the presently unequal international system is transformed into an equitable global community. A critical feature of a new global community will be a zero-carbon economy that is socially and ecologically sustainable, and favours the fulfilment of basic human needs over and above the generation of wealth and excessive material consumption. Achieving such an economy requires a fair allocation of GHG emission entitlements. In principle, a per capita allocation basis may be appropriate but global equity may in some instances require preferential treatment for vulnerable and marginalised people. Governance within a new global community ought to be democratic and foster cooperation between individuals, cultures, nations, social movements, and NGOs. Existing institutions are clearly unable to deliver such a fair and sustainable economic and political order; instead, citizens and civil society are driving the transition.

In the Latin American context, Green Radicalism has a strong indigenous dimension: *Pachamama* (Mother Earth) is being wounded by exploitative modes of development promoted by the West. Carbon markets are rejected on grounds of avoided responsibility, but also because such markets aim to turn a living being (*Pachamama*) into private property, which, from the indigenous perspective is an ontological contradiction. It is the responsibility of the world's people to sustain the life of Mother Nature and respect her rights, and this can be best pursued by acknowledging and valuing the knowledge and customs of indigenous peoples themselves.

4. 'Post-neoliberal' governments and Green Radicalism

4.1 - Post-neoliberalism in Latin America

'Post-neoliberalism' as a term is growing in academic use to describe the policy developments that have accompanied the 'left turn' in Latin America over the past decade. It is not intended to imply a clean break with neoliberalism, defined by Harvey as 'a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within a framework characterized by strong property rights, free markets, and free trade' (2005: 2). Instead, the post-neoliberal era is characterised by various experiments in privileging social interests over economic interests via new relations between the state, market, and society (Sader, 2009; Macdonald and Ruckert, 2009). Post-neoliberal experiments in Latin America are the result of widespread public discontent with the impacts of neoliberal policy imposed throughout the 1980s and 1990s.[x] The Washington Consensus of privatisation, liberalisation, and regulation was accompanied by a range of negative side effects, both social and environmental. Trade unions, the traditional base of social mobilisation, were weakened as employment became more 'flexible', unemployment increased, rural workers migrated to cities, and the informal economy grew while the formal economy shrunk. Although unions have not disappeared in the region, their diminished power has been offset by a plethora of social movements representing indigenous, cultural, feminist, and unemployed interests (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2008). It is in the context of sustained mobilisation by these 'new left' actors that parties and leaders have come to power in numerous Latin American countries on anti-neoliberal (or at least centre-left) platforms and frequently in direct cooperation with social movements (Zibechi, 2009: 185).

A significant post-neoliberal development in the region has been the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), pursued in resistance to the tide of bilateral and multilateral free-trade agreements that has swept the region. ALBA is primarily directed towards reducing poverty, and maximising social inclusion and people's wellbeing (Portal ALBA, 2004). The Alliance was initially proposed by Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez, in 2001. Chávez argued that the people of Latin America would be best served not by a free-trade zone with the United States but rather by 19th century liberator Simón Bolivar's vision of the *Patria Grande*, or Grand Homeland. This would be a politically and economically

unified region based on principles of solidarity instead of competition (Webber, 2010: 14-15; Fermín, 2009: 343-344). There are presently eight members: Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Dominica, Saint Vicente and the Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda. The organisational structure of ALBA comprises the Council of Presidents, the Council of Ministers, and the Council of Social Movements. The last is a recently formed space for Latin American people to gather and cooperate amongst themselves and their governments, with the overall objective of struggling for plurality and harmonious relations between people and nature not just in their own countries but across the world (*Consejo de Movimientos Sociales*, 2009).

4.2 ALBA and global climate governance

Of the eight ALBA members, only five (Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, and Nicaragua) have negotiated as a bloc in international climate negotiations, and even then they have often spoken only in their capacity as individual Parties. These countries attracted considerable attention during the final hours of the Copenhagen summit when they stridently rejected the Copenhagen Accord for its substance and the manner in which it was drafted. But although small states may slip under the radar of most commentators of international climate negotiations, the ALBA countries had not been silent throughout the preceding two years of negotiations. Bolivia, in particular, intervened numerous times and often to challenge economic orthodoxy.[xi] The following excerpt of an intervention in Poznan is reflective of these statements:

> Since colonisation and particularly since the industrial revolution … competition and the thirst for unlimited profit of the capitalist system have been destroying the planet. For capitalism, we are not human beings but rather consumers. For capitalism, Mother Earth doesn't exist, but rather primary resources. Capitalism is the source of asymmetries and imbalances in the world, it generates luxury, ostentation, and extravagance for the few, while millions die of hunger in the world.[xii]

However, it was during COP15 in Copenhagen that ALBA (and particularly Bolivian) delegations' rhetoric and actions became more closely aligned with the discourses of Green Radicalism. The idea that existing authority arrangements at national and global levels would be inadequate for successfully addressing the climate challenge became much more explicit here. In Copenhagen, Bolivian President Evo Morales (known widely as simply 'Evo') sought to serve as a 'bridge' between the formal negotiations among officials and heads of government in the Bella Centre, and the social movements gathering in various settings,

though perhaps principally at Klimaforum09 in a sporting complex in central Copenhagen. This ‘bridging’ can be illustrated with four incidents:

1. The participation of non-governmental indigenous representatives in the Bolivian delegation: The MAS party itself, which has been in government since 2006, emerged from the *cocalero* movement of indigenous coca-producing peasants, and numerous members of Morales’ cabinet are former activists and intellectuals (Dunkerly, 2007: 134). However, the Bolivian delegation included representatives of indigenous organisations that sit outside of Morales’ *cocalero* network, including from the *Confederación Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu* (CONAMAQ), with which MAS has often had strained relations.[xiii] Outspoken critic of the MAS government’s copper mining contracts, Rafael Quispe, spoke freely at a press briefing of the Bolivian delegation at COP15 and explained that the positions of the social movements and the Bolivian government were one (UNFCCC, 2009a).
2. Bolivia’s convening of a UNFCCC submission drafting group: Following an offer from the Bolivian delegation to present ideas from Klimaforum09 as textual suggestions to COP15, a twelve-member drafting committee was formed. One of the members was prominent environmental lawyer, Polly Higgins. Higgins explained how the diverse group spent nine hours revising the 194-page negotiating text to bring it into line with their basic shared understanding that carbon trading and profiteering must stop, values must change, and ecosystems need to be preserved (interview with author, 9/02/2010). Although it appears that the submission ‘got lost in the process of the UNFCCC Secretariat’, Higgins concluded that ultimately this didn’t matter because of its value as a learning process (ibid.).
3. Evo’s attendance at a Klimaforum09 session: Here he heard comments and answered unscreened questioned from members of social movements and NGOs. He told the audience: ‘Politics is a science of serving the people. I live to serve the people.… It is my duty to take your message to the heads of state here. If I make a mistake, let me know so that I can rectify it’ (quoted in Ridenour, 2009).
4. ALBA public meeting: The Klimaforum09 organising committee collaborated with social movement and non-government organisations to demonstrate the potential for cooperation between government and the grassroots. 4000 people squeezed into a Copenhagen sports stadium, or gathered outside, to hear Morales, Chávez, Cuba’s vice

president, Esteban Lazo, and Nicaragua’s foreign minister, Samuel Santos, speak about the negotiations and their diagnosis of the climate change problem.

Back in the Bella Centre, delegates and leaders were less eager to hear ALBA’s thoughts on addressing the structural causes of climate change. No ALBA member was among those selected by the Danish hosts to form a Friends of the President group to work on an agreement that could compensate for the bracket-laden texts of the two UNFCCC working groups. Upon being presented with the three-page Copenhagen Accord that the United States, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil alone decided they could live with, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua were among a small group of countries that refused to allow its adoption as an agreement of the Parties (UNFCCC, 2009b). In the subsequent wake of what many perceived as a failed conference, Evo Morales issued a call to the ‘peoples of the world, social movements and Mother Earth’s defenders, … scientists, academics, lawyers and governments that want to work with their citizens’ to gather in the Bolivian city of Cochabamba for a ‘World Peoples Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth’ (PWCCC 2010a). This call attracted approximately 35,000 people, about three-quarters of whom were Bolivian with others coming from 140 countries. Although civil society accounted for the vast majority of participants, politicians from fifty six countries are also reported to have attended the conference in April 2010 (Morales, 2010).

While ostensibly open to all, the framing of the call effectively constructed a constituency defined by the discourse of Green Radicalism. The following excerpts serve to illustrate this framing:

> Confirming that 75% of historical emissions of greenhouse gases originated in the countries of the North that followed a path of irrational industrialization;
>
> Noting that climate change is a product of the capitalist system;…
>
> Affirming that in order to ensure the full fulfillment of human rights in the twenty-first century, it is necessary to recognize and respect Mother Earth’s rights;
>
> Reaffirming the need to fight for climate justice;…
>
> Confident that the peoples of the world, guided by the principles of solidarity, justice and respect for life, will be able to save humanity and Mother Earth….
>
> The World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth has as objectives:
>
> 1) To analyze the structural and systemic causes that drive climate change and to propose radical measures to ensure the well-being of all humanity in harmony with nature….

> 5) To analyze and develop an action plan to advance the establishment of a Climate Justice Tribunal
>
> 6) To define strategies for action and mobilization to defend life from Climate Change and to defend the Rights of Mother Earth (PWCCC, 2010a).

The conference was organised around seventeen working groups corresponding to the various themes under discussion in the UNFCCC negotiations, as well as self-organised events. Like the conference call, the working groups' agendas were framed in such terms that would resonate with those articulating Green Radical discourses. For example, the mandate of Group 1 was to 'promote the analysis of the underlying, structural root causes of climate change… (and) reveal how… the rise in greenhouse gases are a product of a model of life and development under the capitalist system'. Meanwhile, the mandate of Group 15 was to '…analyze, reflect on, and elaborate proposals for confronting the dangers of carbon markets…' (PWCCC, 2010b).

While it is possible that a range of people may be attracted to the idea of engaging in dialogue with 'peoples of the world, social movements and Mother Earth's defenders', this representation of the problem will most strongly resonate with those articulating discourses of Green Radicalism. As such, the resulting 'People's Agreement' is a strong articulation of Green Radicalism. Through their efforts to promote this document in multilateral settings, ALBA has engaged in what should be understood as 'discursive representation' (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). The 'representative claim' (Saward 2010) has been made by different actors in different contexts. Examples include Venezuela's Minister Hitcher's statement that 'The peoples will have in the revolutionary governments of ALBA an official voice in the (Cancún) Summit', as cited above. Similarly, Bolivia's ambassador to the UN reassured social movements protesting at the sixteenth Conference of the Parties in Cancún that '… our voice is yours, more than ever we have to be here with you to transfer (that voice)' (Solón, 2010b). In submitting the Cochabamba conclusions to the UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action, ALBA governments also claimed to be 'mak(ing) these voices our own' (ALBA 2010). Others, including Bolivia's Foreign Minister and a spokesperson for international peasant movements have referred to Evo Morales as the 'ambassador' of the peoples and of the Cochabamba summit, which is an unambiguous claim of representation (*HidrocarburosBolivia*, 2010; *Boca de Polen*, 2010; CLOC-VC, 2010).[xiv] Even the UN's own representative to the Cochabamba conference, Alicia Bárcena, claimed

that Morales can represent a state and act as a 'spokesperson' to take the positions of civil society groups to the UN (Valdez 2010).

In discussing representation as a process of claim-making, Saward reminds us to be alert to the silencing effect that representative effects can have (2006, 304). The process of constructing 'the represented' in terms that 'the representatives' wish to represent in global climate governance necessarily involves exclusion. In this case, exclusion may occur through actors failing to identify with a particular framing of the problem, but it also occurred in a more explicit fashion by denying diverging voices the opportunity to establish an official eighteenth working group. Bolivian indigenous organisation, CONAMAQ, proposed an eighteenth working group to discuss local socio-environmental issues, and in particular the impacts of an extractionist model of development that the Morales government continues to promote. The Bolivian government rejected their proposal, arguing that the focus needed to be on reaching agreement on the main causes of climate change and the responsibility of the North (Loritz, 2010). However, Working Group 18 (*Mesa 18*) established itself just outside the official venue and attracted considerable attention from the media and conference participants. The Declaration of Working Group 18 was an articulation of the 'radical decentralisation' discourse outlined above, but with a special emphasis on the sovereignty of indigenous peoples. Their declaration renounced, *inter alia,* 'imperialism, transnational corporations, and the so-called progressive Latin American governments that promote energy projects and mega infrastructure … especially in indigenous and protected areas - designed by banks, businesses, and private builders with a neoliberal and exploitative vision' (CONAMAQ, 2010). The official Peoples Agreement similarly denounced 'the way in which the capitalist model imposes mega-infrastructure projects and invades territories with extractive projects, water privatization, and militarized territories, expelling indigenous peoples from their lands, inhibiting food sovereignty and deepening socio-environmental crisis.' This latter declaration, though, made no reference to the role of regional governments in promoting such projects.

5. Critically evaluating ALBA's representation of Green Radicalism

The representation of diverse discourses in global climate governance is vital for preventing the unchallenged dominance of any one discourse. It also offers an opportunity for ensuring inclusivity at a time when many are questioning how 192 states can possibly reach agreement through the UN system. But this raises a number of questions concerning how discourses

generally articulated within safe enclave spaces can be appropriately and effectively translated to wider public and empowered spaces. In this section I evaluate ALBA's representation of Green Radicalism on the basis of three questions: Is the rhetoric used by ALBA appropriate to the task of representing a discourses? Is ALBA making itself accountable to those it aims to represent? How legitimate is ALBA's representative claim from the perspective of others articulating Green Radical discourses?

5.1. Is the rhetoric used by ALBA appropriate to the task of representing a discourse?

The public sphere of global climate governance tends to be characterized by discrete settings in which particular discourses flourish (Stevenson and Dryzek 2011). Such enclave settings can be beneficial by allowing groups, especially marginalised or disempowered ones, to 'formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs' (Fraser, 1992: 123) and thereby develop distinct and coherent discourses. But representing such discourses in wider public and empowered settings requires designated individuals to effectively 'translate' ideas that make sense in a specific context to 'foreign' contexts (Young, 2000: 69; Mansbridge, 1996: 58; Dryzek, 2010: 320). The rhetoric employed for this translation task will affect the impact of representation. Rhetoric is any utterance made with the intention of persuading or affecting an audience. In recent years some democratic theorists have moved away from the Platonic tradition of dismissing rhetoric as inherently manipulative and have instead sought to capture its virtuous and communicative functions (e.g., Young, 2000; Chambers, 2009; Dryzek, 2010). These theorists present a variety of distinctions for defensible and indefensible rhetoric by considering, for example, whether it advances general interests over specific interests; opens or closes opportunities to be challenged; or promotes critical reflection rather than playing to known biases.[xv] Perhaps the most useful distinction for evaluating the rhetoric of a discursive representative is Dryzek's distinction between bridging and bonding rhetoric (2010: 328-30).[xvi] This distinction directs attention to the different functions that rhetoric serves in the context of different audiences; it is therefore helpful for evaluating the rhetoric of actors moving between a discursive enclave and a wider setting in which multiple discourses may be present. Bonding rhetoric can have the effect of strengthening ties between people who share a discourse. This may be appropriate within gatherings of similarly marginalised people whose position may be strengthened through enhanced relations and feelings of unity. Bridging rhetoric seeks to understand and reach out to those known to have other, but potentially overlapping or compatible, discursive

commitments. Effectively advancing the needs and interests of a constituency will generally require a representative to emphasise aspects of a discourse that differently positioned people can potentially accept. The aim is to attract support for a desired outcome by appealing to ideas and reasons that differently positioned people (with a range of discursive commitments) can understand and appreciate. Bridging rhetoric is ultimately essential for effective discursive representation (ibid.: 328-29).

Close reading of ten speeches made by ALBA government delegates between December 2009 and December 2010[xvii] reveal the following patterns of rhetoric:

Bonding rhetoric is pervasive. It is easily discerned in enclave settings of Green Radicalism, such as the Cochabamba peoples' summit. Here, Evo Morales' opening address appealed to common values, concepts, and language among the audience of social movements (including indigenous, environmentalist, labour and feminist movements), and members of green, Marxist, and communist political parties from around the world. Particular emphasis is placed on juxtaposing the environmentally and socially destructive capitalist model of development with harmonious indigenous communities' modes of living; and the irrationality of Western modern thought and customs with the rationality of ancestral and indigenous thought and customs. Bonding in this context can be understood not only as strengthening ties between disparate groups within the audience but also strengthening ties between civil society and post-neoliberal governments. Illustrative are the repeated references in this address to their shared struggle, vision, and strength (Morales, 2010c). Similarly, vice-president of Cuba, Esteban Lazo Hernández's speech during the closing ceremony demonstrated his government's solidarity with social movements and peoples of the world by employing their language of 'Mother Earth', '*Pachamama'*, and 'climate debt' (Hernández 2010). Whereas Morales and Hernández engaged with the theme of climate and environment, Hugo Chávez's closing speech in Cochabamba can be read as an exercise in bonding the peoples and governments of Latin America within the wider context of ALBA's regional integration (Chávez, 2010). This is explicit in his closing statement: '… we have come to Cochabamba to further charge our batteries to continue the Revolution and to continue promoting Socialism in Latin America'. In a speech of more than 2000 words, a mere five references are made to climate. Instead, Chávez emphasises Venezuela's solidarity with the people of Bolivia and likens Morales to Simón Bolívar by citing a famous poem written in homage to the nineteenth century liberator:

> Just as Choquehuanca said when Bolívar arrived on these lands: "*With the centuries will grow your glory just as the shadow grows when the sun sets*", we can today say this to Evo. Evo has become, who would doubt it, not only a leader of the Bolivian people but one of the leaders of the Latin American and Caribbean people (Chávez, 2010).

Chávez contextualises the climate crisis in the myriad other crises to which ALBA is a response: political, social, financial, ecological crises; the crises of capitalism and imperialism. The bellicosity of Chávez's rhetoric is perhaps unsurprising given his military background; to emerge victorious in the battle against climate change, the people must continue to be deployed and intensify the 'battle of ideas'.[xviii] Chávez leaves no doubt that this is a battle between capitalism, the victorious ideology in the twentieth century, and socialism, 'humanity's salvation' in the twenty-first century (ibid.).

Bonding rhetoric can also be discerned in wider pluralist spaces where bridging rhetoric may be more appropriate. In such cases, speeches can be understood as reaching beyond the immediate audience to a broader, outside audience.[xix] Addressing the high level segment of the Copenhagen Summit in 2009, Morales acknowledges that there are deep differences among the governments present: there are those who subscribe to a 'culture of life' (socialism: living well), and those who subscribe to a 'culture of death' (capitalism: living better). Those who understand climate change in Green Radical terms may immediately see this statement as legitimate, but such rhetoric is perhaps incomprehensible to those whose ontology includes such concepts as 'green capitalism' and 'green growth', i.e., those who understand the climate issue in Mainstream Sustainability or Expansive Sustainability terms (Dryzek and Stevenson 2011). Moreover, the nuanced and reflective arguments articulated by many non-state actors within Green Radical enclaves are poorly transmitted when the matter is painted in such broad and exclusive terms of capitalism versus socialism. Further bonding rhetoric directed at other left governments and social movements can be found in Morales' pledge to build on their regional successes and jointly overthrow capitalism 'to save humanity' (2009b). Morales concludes by expressing his lack of faith in resolving climate change under the existing arrangements, and calls instead on the 'peoples of the world to organise, become aware, unite, and mobilise to end capitalism and thereby save humanity and planet earth' (ibid.). Speaking the following day, Morales continues to emphasise the distance between the positions of developed country governments and those of 'the peoples', reducing the debate to killing versus saving lives (Morales, 2009a). Chávez's speech in the high level segment in Copenhagen can also be read as bonding with an external audience of protesters. Here he employs their slogans ('Don't change the climate, change the

system’ and ‘If the climate were a bank, they would have saved it by now’) and cites philosophers ranging from Karl Marx to Jesus Christ to defend the argument that capitalism and wealth are destroying the planet (Chávez, 2009).

In the speeches analysed, bridging rhetoric is employed in an apparently selective manner. Speeches made by Chávez and Morales reveal apparent efforts to bridge the positions of ALBA and ‘the peoples’ with the G77 bloc of developing countries while emphasising the chasm between their positions and those of the North. Presenting the Peoples’ Agreement to the G77 plus China in May 2010, Morales acknowledged the diversity of positions within the G77 but argues that a successful outcome in Cancún would require strong unity and participation of the world’s people (2010b). While highlighting the responsibility and culpability of the developed countries, Morales insists that the G77 has the strength to save humanity and planet Earth, and ensure that the voice of their peoples is heard and respected: ‘*This is the strength of unity of the sardines against the sharks*’ (ibid.). The tone and language used by Morales to address the G77 is patently different to that used within the setting of the Cochabamba meeting; both are more moderate and palatable to a wider audience. To persuade the governments of developing countries of the merits of the Peoples’ Agreement, Morales first maps the points of convergence between the positions of the G77 and those of ‘the peoples’ before introducing those aspects of the Agreements that are less likely to attract immediate acceptance. The word ‘capitalism’ is uttered merely twice towards the end of the speech, compared to twenty-four times during the opening of the Cochabamba meeting. Morales repeatedly returns to the culpability and responsibility of the North and uses the ‘climate debt’ of the North as a segue into introducing the proposed ‘Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth’, the potential effect of this is to assuage the concerns that many G77 governments may hold about the implications of such a document for their own countries.

Chávez’s speech to the high level segment in Copenhagen can also be read as an effort to bridge their position with those of other developing countries. He does so firstly by highlighting their common experience of exclusion and domination; secondly by vocally supporting the positions of Brazil, China, and India that resonate with the positions of ALBA; and thirdly by defending China against pressure from the United States and others to reduce their emissions by highlighting disparities in their wealth and per capita emissions (Chávez, 2009).

A rare, and perhaps unique, example of bridging rhetoric directed at industrialised countries of the North can be found in Morales’ address to delegates at COP16 in December 2010. Morales used this opportunity to share the conclusions of the Cochabamba summit. Although the substance of most of these conclusions may be much more ambitious and far reaching that any developed country government could directly support, Morales cites their common democratic values and mandates to appeal to these countries to listen to the peoples’ voices:

> If we are presidents and governments democratically elected by our peoples, we have an obligation to listen to the clamorous requests of the world’s peoples. We have an obligation to heed and adopt the decisions of the world’s peoples. And we cannot, here behind closed doors, try to impose documents that do not express the sentiment of the peoples… (Morales, 2010a).

In sum, there is ample evidence of bonding rhetoric that may assist with consolidating relations and feelings of unity among actors sharing a Green Radical discourse. Such rhetoric is articulated both within enclave settings and also in wider pluralist settings where speakers project their words beyond the immediate audience to an external one. Bridging rhetoric is essential for the effective representation of a discourse in a pluralist setting but, as I have shown, this is used sparingly and selectively. Evo Morales and Hugo Chávez have demonstrated an interest in bridging the positions of ALBA and ‘the peoples’ with those of the G77. But when addressing the wider gatherings of the UNFCCC, both leaders appear more concerned with widening the chasm between ‘the peoples’ and the developed countries rather than bridging their differences to any extent.

4.2. Is ALBA accountable to those it aims to represent?

Accountability in relations of representation is generally understood to require sanctioning power: the represented should be able to punish (or reward) those charged with representing their interests. However, Mansbridge (2009) makes a strong argument that in relations of representation characterised by ‘self-motivated agents’ and an alignment of both parties’ objectives, close monitoring and sanctioning is not the most appropriate model of accountability. Instead, such circumstances favour ‘narrative’ and ‘deliberative’ forms of accountability, based on an understanding of accountability as ‘giving an account’. Mansfield writes: ‘In *narrative* and *deliberative* accountability, the representative explains the reasons for her actions and even (ideally) engages in two-way communication with constituents,

particularly when deviating from the constituents' preferences' (2009: 384). A communicative style of accountability is also central to Dryzek and Niemeyer's theory of discursive representation:

> To be accountable to the discourse (or discourses) they represent, representatives must continue to communicate in terms that make sense within that discourse (or discourses), even as they encounter different others … and even as they reflect and change their minds in such encounters (2008: 490).

There is a publicity dimension to this model of accountability whereby representatives ought publicly justify any change in the discursive terms in which they communicate. To the extent that discursive representatives move between 'enclaves' and pluralist settings, it is reasonable to apply a communicative standard of accountability that requires representatives to **a)** communicate in terms that make sense to a particular discourse; **b)** provide an account of their actions (including justification for ceasing to communicate in terms that reflect the discourse they represent) that is accessible to a diffuse 'constituency' of adherents to the discourse; and **c)** engage in two-way communication with members of a discursive enclave such that all parties may pose and respond to questions. How, then, does the case of ALBA measure up against this standard?

Despite earlier claims that 'The peoples will have in … ALBA an official voice in the (Cancún) Summit' (Minister Hitcher quoted in *Abrebrecha*, 2010), by the final night of negotiations only Bolivia remained faithful to the terms of Green Radicalism. The unified position that ALBA had maintained throughout the preceding two weeks of negotiations splintered as Bolivian ambassador, Pablo Solón, stood alone in objecting to the negotiated decisions. Solón's reasons were both procedural and substantive (including low level of ambition; absence of individual quantifiable targets; lack of clarity on provision of financial and technological resources; nominated role for World Bank) (Solón, 2010c). By contrast, Venezuela's head negotiator intervened in the final session to say that although the level of ambition reached was unsatisfactory for some, the documents were 'full of hope' and offered a path forward (Salerno, 2010). Cuban negotiator, Bruno Rodríguez, called on the parties to listen to the concerns raised by Bolivia, speaking in the name of the Latin American peoples. He expressed dissatisfaction with several elements of the texts but nevertheless identified himself as 'a realist' and acknowledged that specific commitments would not be established in Cancún (Rodríguez, 2010). For Ecuador, the texts were a sign of progress but required improvement over the following year (IISD, 2010).

Bolivia performs impressively against the expectation that it provide accounts of its behaviour that are accessible to diffuse adherents to Green Radicalism. Throughout 2010, the website of the Cochabamba conference was frequently updated with copies of submissions and interventions to UNFCCC meetings (PWCCC, 2010c). During COP16 in Cancún, Evo Morales and Pablo Solón met with members of social movements and addressed public gatherings; and numerous press briefings were held at the negotiating venue during which Ambassador Solón explained Bolivia’s position and responded to questions. In the aftermath of the Cancún negotiations, Bolivia posted an explanation for its actions on the Cochabamba conference website and Pablo Solón published an article in The Guardian newspaper titled ‘Why Bolivia stood alone in opposing the Cancún climate agreement’ (Solón, 2010d). Beyond statements made during the final formal meetings of the Cancún meetings, there is little evidence of other ALBA members providing an account for their actions to those they earlier had claimed to represent. Although some meetings are available for viewing on the Internet, this alone cannot be understood as an open and accessible form of public accountability.

Deliberative accountability, or two-way dialogue, is found to be weaker than narrative accountability. With the exception of the question-and-answer segments of press briefings, publicly-oriented accounts tend to be monologues with audience engagement limited to vocal displays of support. There are exceptions, however. As noted above, Evo Morales held an open dialogue with civil society at Klimaforum09 in which he sought feedback on his actions during COP15; this is a good example of ‘deliberative accountability’. Other more exclusive dialogues have also taken place. The final day of the Cochabamba conference featured a dialogue between government representatives (including presidents Morales and Chávez) and coordinators of the seventeen working groups (*Los Tiempos*, 2010). This session was closed to the rest of the conference participants. In Cancún, small meetings between members of the Bolivian delegation and members of Vía Campesina also took place. One member of Vía Campesina, (*name temporarily withheld*), said that this meeting provided an opportunity to reassure Ambassador Solón that he was not alone in his stand because he had the support of those in the streets (interview with author, 17/01/2011).

4.3. How legitimate is ALBA’s representative claim from the perspective of others articulating Green Radical discourses?

Cooperation between governments and social movements has often been fraught with problems and disappointments, not least in Latin America (see de la Torre 2009), so it is important to critically question representative claims that allow a government, or government-based alliance, to speak on behalf of 'the people'. To gauge the perspective of those potentially represented by the ALBA's positions in multilateral climate negotiations, a survey was carried out at the Cochabamba conference, and semi-structured interviews were conducted with members of movements or organisations that had supported the People's Agreement and/or engaged in climate justice forums in Copenhagen or Cancún during climate negotiations.[xx] This section also draws on my own observations of these gatherings. The contested nature of the representative claim was strongly communicated through these inquiries. One axis of contestation rests on Day's dichotomy of the 'politics of the act' versus 'the politics of demand' (2004: 733). Social movements engaged in the former seek through autonomous action 'to block, resist and render redundant both corporate and state power in local, national and transnational contexts' (ibid). In Holloway's terms, they seek to 'change the world without taking power' (2002), and are therefore not focused on the formal negotiations in the United Nations. The 'politics of demand', by contrast, refers to 'actions oriented to ameliorating the practices of states, corporations and everyday life, through either influencing or using state power to achieve irradiation effects' (Day, 2004: 733-734). The representative claim is rendered redundant by the former but may have some legitimacy for the latter. The tension between a politics of the act and a politics of demand is evident in contrasting messages directed from the Cochabamba conference to the UN. During the opening ceremony, the UN's representative Alicia Bálcena struggled to speak over loud chants of *'Fuera! Fuera!'* (Get out!) coming from pockets of the audience. Others, though, have explicitly supported transferring the Cochabamba conclusions to the UN negotiations as evident in a letter signed by more than forty organisations that called on delegates at the UNFCCC negotiations in Tianjin to consider the Cochabamba agreement (CJN!, 2010).

Beyond this broader contextual legitimacy lies a spectrum of perspectives concerning the legitimacy of social movements being represented by members of governments. At one end of this spectrum is complete support for the efforts of Evo Morales and/or ALBA to represent 'the peoples' in multilateral climate negotiations; at the other end is rejection of the notion that civil society can be represented by an intergovernmental body. In between these two poles are those who see some merit in using state instruments to achieve short-term gains, while nevertheless maintaining a focus on movement-building for the long-term; and

those who see it as inevitable that governments and the UN need to be engaged while still pushing for better opportunities for civil society to represent themselves. While the balance of opinion was tilted in favour of representation, trust was evidently a major concern at the Cochabamba conference. Many felt that trust between peoples and governments was non-existent on the issue of climate change because trust has historically been broken; because governments/politicians are always trying to serve their own, generally short-term, interests; and/or because governments are weak against big business. Some do acknowledge, though, that Evo Morales is an exception because he is a product of social movements and is making an effort to continue working with them. This itself was also evident in the chants of ‘*Evo, amigo, el pueblo está contigo!*’ (Evo, friend, the people are with you!) repeated throughout the Cochabamba meeting.

The credibility of actors articulating Green Radicalism while remaining tied to a model of development based on extracting and exporting natural resources (including fossil fuels), is also a factor that needs to be considered when evaluating the legitimacy of the representative claims. This structural dependence has strained domestic relations between ‘post-neoliberal’ governments and environmental and indigenous groups, especially in Ecuador and Bolivia. In 2008, Ecuador passed a new Constitution that is unprecedented in its environmental provisions; Mother Earth is granted rights (to respect and protection), and citizens are granted the right to live well in a healthy and sustainable environment. But the ink was barely dry on the new Constitution when President Correa passed a mining law considered unconstitutional. Correa’s response to ensuing protests was to dismiss the environmentalist and indigenous groups opposed to the law as ‘childish’, ‘nobodies’ and ‘allies of the right’ who ‘want to force us to remain like beggars sitting atop a bag of gold’ (quoted in Dosh and Kilgerman, 2009: 23). Such rhetoric has recently been echoed in Bolivia when indigenous peoples have protested against the Morales Government’s promotion of export-oriented hydrocarbon and mining projects. In response to their demands for ‘the respect of *Pachamama* and sacred places’, environmental conservation, and debate on a new model of sustainable development, Morales and his vice-president have accused indigenous peoples of being manipulated and bribed by environmental NGOs and US and EU aid agencies who wish to keep Bolivia in sixteenth century conditions (*Econoticias Bolivia*, 2010). In another recent incident, two senior members of Bolivia’s environment ministry resigned over pressure to approve an environmental licence for a highway to be constructed through land protected as indigenous ancestral territory and a national park (Servindi, 2010).

Among those interviewed, the potential charge of hypocrisy prompted a range of responses. A few were critical of what they perceived as a ‘double discourse’ being articulated by Evo Morales and/or other members of ALBA. At the other end of the spectrum were a few who directed their criticism towards outsiders who focus on the domestic record of these Latin American states instead of on their stated intentions. From this perspective, the domestic situation is being used as a red herring by those ignoring the inevitable constraints imposed on states by the global capitalist system in which they remain involuntarily embedded. Between these two polar positions many were ambivalent: while they recognised the importance of moving beyond extraction economies and fossil fuel consumption, they were unsure about the implications of these for the credibility of state-based representatives.

6. Conclusion

Despite the dismissive manner in which ALBA is frequently treated by observers and participants in multilateral climate negotiations, the representation of a marginal set of discourses is a function that should not be dismissed. The concerns and assumptions inherent in Green Radicalism merit consideration and response both for the sake of democratic legitimacy (acknowledging that many people who may be affected by climate change and/or mitigation actions perceive the issue in Green Radical terms), and also for the sake of enhancing the rationality of potential decisions and agreements (by subjecting them to a range of critiques). Nevertheless, the case of ALBA examined in this paper points to the potential hazards of transmitting a public discourse through a state-based instrument, even when a state appears to share that discourse. The structural constraints imposed on states by the international system undermine their capacity to consistently represent an economically radical and politically progressive discourse. This is especially evident at the domestic level where dissenting activists are sometimes dismissed, insulted, or even repressed by government actors. But it is also evident at the international level where pressure to comply and preserve norms of multilateralism saw all ALBA members except Bolivia endorse the set of decisions emerging from Cancún, despite the fact that these ignored the demands of the Cochabamba agreements. Improving the inclusivity of discursive representation is perhaps then a matter that ought to be addressed as part of the wider debate on enhancing the involvement of civil society in climate negotiations (which, for example, is presently under review in the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Implementation - SBI). Representation by civil society is, of course, not without its problems and weaknesses. But the potential for

consistent discursive representation is potentially higher if representatives are drawn from civil society, given their relative freedom from the domestic and international structural constraints experienced by state actors. This remains, though, an open question for future investigation.

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[i] Translations from Spanish in this paper are my own unless indicated as quoted in an English source.

[ii] Drexhage and Murphy 2009.

[iii] Comment of senior negotiator under Chatham House rule.

[iv] *Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América*.

[v] The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the primary multilateral setting for global governance of climate change.

[vi] This example is based on Hitcher’s statement that ‘The peoples will have in the revolutionary governments of ALBA an official voice in the (Cancún) Summit’ (*Abrebrecha* 2010).

[vii] This section draws heavily on Dryzek and Stevenson 2011: section 4.1.

[viii] 560 side event applications were submitted to the Secretariat. The compiled applicant list was used to generate a sample. Multiple proposals by the same organisation were excluded, as were government/intergovernmental applications (given the interest in identifying *public* discourses). The remaining 344 applicants were categorised on principal theme (including justice, spirituality, adaptation, indigenous peoples, forests, financing, security, and technology), to ensure that the sample was representative of all key topics. From these categorised events, a sample of 120 applicants was selected for a discourse analysis. The selection was affected by two limitations: material for analysis had to be available online, and had to be available in a language understood by at least one author (English and Spanish). Materials for analysis were sourced from applicant organisations' websites. Materials comprised written texts (declarations, information brochures and publicity, press releases, UNFCCC written submissions, website text, research and position briefings, and magazine articles); posters, and videos. These materials provided the basis for identifying and recording the constitutive elements of discourses (ontology; assumptions about natural conditions and relationships; agents and their motives; and key metaphors) (see Dryzek, 2005: 17–19). The overall message of each piece of material was also recorded to assist with identifying patterns across them. The patterns discussed here were discerned from this data (Dryzek and Stevenson 2011).

[ix] Evidence of these discourses articulated in other public settings is presented in (Stevenson and Dryzek 2011).

[x] For discussion on this see Hershberg and Rosen, 2006; Keeling, 2004.

[xi] AWG-LCA, 4th session, 03/12/2008; AWG-LCA, 5th session, 01/04/2009: 10:00 (second intervention during Q&A).

[xii] AWG-LCA, 4th session, 03/12/2008. Author’s own translation from the original Spanish intervention. The official English interpretation delivered on the UNFCCC webcast was uncharacteristically poor and contained errors and important omissions.

[xiii] On relations between MAS and CONAMAQ see (*Europa Press*, 2007; *Agence France Presse*, 2009).

[xiv] On the ambassador as a representative, see (Pitkin, 1967: 133).

[xv] See Dryzek (2010) for a summary of this literature.

[xvi] Dryzek explains that the ‘basic terminology is taken from Robert Putnam’s treatment of social capital: bonding is associating with people who are similar in social background, bridging is associating with people with different social characteristics’ (2010: 328).

[xvii] Each of these speeches is available online: Solón 2010a; ALBA 2010; Chávez 2010, 2009; Hernández 2010; Morales 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2009a, 2009b.

[xviii] This phrase can most recently and explicitly be attributed to Fidel Castro, and Chávez acknowledges this reference in his speech. On the Cuban reference see (Font, 2009).

[xix] Indeed, the fact that heads of government’s speeches in the UNFCCC are scheduled to coincide with television prime time in their own countries suggests that the target audience is often different from the immediate audience.

[xx] Forty-nine English- or Spanish-speaking participants were randomly surveyed in Cochabamba. Twenty telephone interviews addressing this topic (partly or exclusively) have been carried out by the author. In some cases these individuals spoke in their capacity as politically active citizens (who may be engaged with numerous movements), but here I will use ‘social movements’ as an umbrella term for those interviewed/surveyed.

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