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Group Dynamics and Deliberative Processes: Cognitive and Affective Aspects

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Deliberative theory tends to stress rationality and people's capacity to reason about issues. Psychologically speaking, this entails an emphasis on individual cognitive processes and rationality. Emotion, according to the classic (Habermasian) view of deliberation, is undesirable as it is understood as synonymous with the manipulation of public opinion by political actors, who strategically deploy emotive language to dupe the public (Walton, 2007)—a process that deliberation serves to correct. But should deliberation be viewed as purely cognitive? Do all forms of emotion work against achieving deliberative outcomes? Or is there a proper role for affect?

Psychological research suggests that deliberation cannot be purely cognitive (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Forgas, 1995; Molewijk, Kleinlugtenbelt, & Widdershoven, 2011). The way we reason about reality results from the interaction of cognitive and emotional mechanisms (Phelps, 2006). Deliberative theory itself has taken a turn away from a purely rationalist approach and returned to a more Aristotelian conception of deliberation as a phronetic process of practical judgment (Abizadeh, 2002), where the reasoning process itself involves dialogue, rather than abstract thought (Mercier & Landemore, 2012). This is evidenced in part by the growing appeals for forms of rhetoric, embodying calls to emotion as well as logic, to be considered legitimate forms of deliberative input (Chambers, 2009; Dryzek, 2000, 2010; Sanders, 1997; Yack, 2006). Others suggest that emotion is not only legitimate but in fact an important aspect of deliberation (e.g., Hall, 2007; Mansbridge, Hartz-Karp, Amengual, & Gastil, 2006; Thompson & Hoggett, 2001). In moving beyond the duality reason–emotion and incorporating emotion as an epistemological tool (O'Neill, 2002; Ryan, 2005) it is argued that situations are appraised not only cognitively but also emotionally. Emotional appraisal provides further information about private and public issues that is putatively not contained in purely cognitive assessments. Rather than being seen as a means of manipulation, emotions are understood as open to dialogue and thereby to deliberation (O'Neill, 2002).

Deliberative theory (particularly in the US tradition) has also tended to portray ideal deliberation as involving cognitive process of isolated individuals (Rosenberg, 2007). We concur with Rosenberg's argument that such an asocial account of deliberation is not well grounded in what actually happens in either human cognition, or deliberation in practice. Rather than being merely an individual act of information processing inside the head, cognition is also a process of "understanding with others" (De Jaegher, Di Paolo, & Gallagher, 2010, p. 442) in particular contexts. As such it takes place both inside and between heads. Social cognition results from social interactions and processes of mutual influence that generate shared identity, perception, behaviour, norms, beliefs, meaning, and emotions. The emergence of shared identity, or the experience of self as interchangeable with others, as a result of group interactions during actual deliberation (Black, 2008; Campbell, 2005; Hartz-Karp, Anderson, Gastil, & Felicetti, 2010) is an example of the social grounding of cognition.

Deliberation is a group process and can, therefore, not be divorced from the dynamics of group life. Social psychology has examined group psychology in depth and the concepts associated with it such as social identity and "shared reality," and group emotions. We believe that deliberative theory can move forward by taking input from social and group psychology with respect to the relationship between social cognition and emotion, the emergence of a common ground/shared identity, and how these factors may affect and be affected by deliberation. In this paper, following a survey of the literature concerning the potential role of emotion and identity in what has otherwise been seen as purely cognitive processes in deliberative theory, we turn to evidence gathered from the example of the Australian Citizens'

Parliament. Our first task there is to demonstrate as far as possible that something that we might call deliberation in a broad sense (without stretching the concept beyond its theoretical limits) has taken place. We do this in two steps, first by accessing survey data from participants regarding the conduct of the process, and then by tracking the transformative effects of the deliberative process. We then explore the extent to which emotion and shared identity played a role in the deliberative experience and the implications for deliberative theory.

Cognition, Emotion, and Shared Identity

Although reason is undoubtedly a basic element in deliberation, too strong an emphasis on reasoning capacity may be detrimental to the understanding of deliberative processes. Insights from social psychology demonstrate that cognition is intertwined with affect (Duncan & Barrett, 2007; Forgas, 2008; Storbeck & Clore, 2007). There is evidence that emotions affect the information that we attend to; which concepts and knowledge structures that become activated in a particular situation; the cognitive resources available to process information; and the ways in which information is used in deliberation (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). In political contexts it has been demonstrated that people take longer time to process political information that is perceived as incongruent with pre-existing affect associated with a political candidate. Additionally, when affect is incongruent with the information received, initial attitudes towards the candidate are strengthened rather than revised.[1] Interestingly, from a point of view of deliberative theory, when participants are motivated towards accuracy, there are no time differences in the processing of incongruent information about candidates (Redlawsk, 2002). Whereas these results suggest that reasoning, judgment, and information processing are shaped in ways consistent with the affective state salient at the time, they also suggest that the influence of affect can be overcome by motivation toward accuracy. These findings suggest that deliberative theory needs to account for emotion and the role that affective states may play in deliberation and, consequently, in its outcomes.

The role that affect plays in cognition, and therefore in deliberation, has been previously identified by Rosenberg (2007). Rosenberg presents a strong case for the need to depart from an asocial view of deliberation as a strictly rational activity among reasonable individuals. However, he portrays human cognition in terms of deficit and deficiency, influenced by the *cognitive miser* model (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) of social cognition and drawing on research that often involves cognition in non-deliberative contexts. We see a disjuncture in that the evidence that he gathers comes primarily from studies where cognition is represented as an intrapersonal process. He presupposes that the same individuals ought to do no better in more deliberative contexts, but there is evidence, albeit relatively tentative, that this may not be the case (Grönlund, Setälä, & Herne, 2010; Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, 2002).

Scholarship on social cognition has moved from the idea of the cognitive miser to a more pragmatic view of the social perceiver as someone who tries to make sense of the world in ways that suit their immediate needs (Oakes & Turner, 1990; Smith & Semin, 2004). Rather than depicting cognition in terms of bias and deficit we believe that a view where cognition is seen as multiple "grounded" (Barsalou, 2007) better explains an actor's interaction with the world. This approach allows an understanding of cognition as contingent rather than flawed. Evidence demonstrates that cognition is grounded in simulations, situations, bodily states and motivation (see Barsalou, 2007; Smith & Semin, 2004). It is entirely possible, as Rosenberg seems to allude

[1] Specifically, Redlawsk (2002) found that upon learning negative information about their preferred candidate, individuals tended to increase their positive evaluations about them.

to himself, that the deliberative experience can involve group processes that ground cognition in particular ways and motivate individuals to engage in deeper processing of the issues at hand than is ordinarily the case (Niemeyer, 2011).

Although ultimately, reason, cognition and emotion are psychological functions of individuals, there is plenty of evidence demonstrating the impact of group identity on social cognition (e.g., Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Reynolds, 1998) and emotion (e.g., Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008; Seger, Smith, & Mackie, 2009; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). Public deliberation, although requiring individual reasoning, is a rhetorical process that takes place within a group context and as such is influenced by group dynamics and the shared cognitions and emotions that may arise from such processes. As such, cognition as well as emotion cannot be understood solely in individual terms.

Deliberative forums bring together people from different paths of life but, as they get together to deliberate on an issue, they also come to share a reality that connects them in important ways (Black, 2008). This common reality—or "symbolic convergence" (Bormann, Cragan, & Shields, 2001)—tends to lead to an emergent group identity, which reshapes self- and social perception and beliefs (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994), and spark group-level emotions (Seger, et al., 2009). There are thus good reasons to assume that shared reality leads to the convergence of experience among ingroup members across a variety of psychological dimensions. More specifically, shared reality generates similar self-categorisations (shared social identity), shared emotionality, and shared cognition. Rosenberg (2007) identifies this kind of process as being necessary to shift the frame of thinking in citizens from pursuing narrow self-interest to the collective pursuit of optimal outcomes to commonly shared issues. Indeed, research on group decision-making has demonstrated that shared cognition leads to greater acceptance of others' position as legitimate as well as greater satisfaction with decision implementation (Mohammed & Ringseis, 2001). Similarly, shared group identity promotes restrain of self-interest in favour of the common good (Kramer & Brewer, 1984). Most importantly, when deliberation is part of procedural politics, as is the case of Porto Alegre in Brazil, it has been demonstrated that citizens become more empowered, civil associations grow, collective action is strengthened and individualism is restrained (Koonings, 2004; Novy & Leubolt, 2005).

Deliberation and Collective Identity

Deliberative forums, in which genuine deliberation takes place, are characterised, among other things, by prescriptive rules and norms about listening, communication and interaction that promote a critical evaluation of arguments (Dryzek, 2000). Moreover, Dryzek and Niemeyer argue that deliberation should ideally lead to a shared conception regarding the issue at hand (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2006; Niemeyer & Dryzek, 2007). These ideals appear consistent with the idea of shared group identity, according to which ingroup members come to share norms and beliefs that define the group (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).

Most empirical investigation has worked with group categories that are well established in the social structure (e.g., gender, nationality, ethnicity, profession) and that the person easily can refer to. It is also true that, sometimes, social categories are more temporary, as can be the case in experimental settings, or emerge without an explicit or readily available comparison outgroup (e.g., Oakes, Haslam, Morrison, & Grace, 1995). In such cases, the mere emergence of an "us" implies a "them," which in such case denotes anyone who is not "we".

Recently, it has been suggested that this kind of identity emerges as a result of a bottom-up process within intragroup relations, where no comparison outgroup is readily available, rather than through top-down processes, as in intergroup relations, where social identities are inferred from social categories existing in reality (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005). It is argued that the observation of other group members' behaviours lead people to induce more general characteristics of the ingroup. This is also more likely to be the case in situations in which group members share observations or experiences with each other.

Perhaps ironically, this suggests that, in some circumstances, individual diversity may lead to ingroup homogeneity. Indeed, research shows that level of consensus increases after people have engaged in group discussion (Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999) and intragroup communication helps shaping similarities between people in respect to relevant dimensions (Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005). From these underlying similarities, norms and values are created that help to define an emergent group identity (Poole & Baldwin, 1996).

Some observers have feared the net impact of such group processes, owing to the risk that discussions—even ostensibly deliberative ones—may lead to "groupthink" (e.g., Dietz, Stern, & Dan, 2009; Solomon, 2006). Groupthink is defined as "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive ingroup, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action" (Janis, 1982, p. 9). In addition to the ambiguity of empirical results testing the theory (Esser, 1998), even as a theoretical proposition groupthink requires norms that explicitly encourage convergent thinking and lack efficient countervailing decision-making procedures (Hogg, 1992). The particularity of the prescriptive norms and participant diversity inherent in public deliberative events also run contrary to the structural causes of groupthink. Additionally, individuality itself can be a group norm (McAuliffe, Jetten, Hornsey, & Hogg, 2003), and any robust conception of deliberation stresses the important role of dissent (Barber, 1984; Gastil, 1993) and contestation (Dryzek, 2000).

There is also a prima facie argument that emphasis on group identity conflicts with the ideal of autonomy that is prized by liberal democrats and many deliberative democrats, where autonomy is historically linked to the will of the individual, which is "aggregated" by voting (among liberal democrats) and deliberated (by some deliberative democrats). In light of both the reality and desirability of group identity in deliberation, Rosenberg (2007) recasts the ideal of autonomy as the freedom to not only pursue one's own ends but also the equal opportunity to pursue the common interest via deliberation among the group. We would argue that it is precisely the establishment of a deliberating group identity with group-defining deliberative norms that facilitates the pursuing of this goal. And it needs not necessarily involve the emergence of simple consensus. In such groups, strong identification with a group and its deliberative norms can actually promote divergent arguments during times of conflict (Packer, 2008, 2009). This is precisely because the motivation of the group is ideally deliberative, to seek the best outcome for the common good, which may not necessarily involve simple consensus per se (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2006). What a deliberative group identity does provide, however, is the requisite space in which individuals feel free to express their positions in an atmosphere of mutual respect and willingness to encounter different points of view. We believe it is the achievement of this kind of identity that distinguishes genuine deliberation from the vagaries of group processes such as group think and group polarisation (see also Mercier & Landemore, 2012).

The Present Research

The above overview of research strongly suggests that the dialogic exercise during deliberation is not only based on reason but emotion also is an integral part of the deliberative process. Most importantly, because the deliberative process is likely to generate shared reality and shared identity, participants' behaviour is more prone to become driven by their social rather than their personal identities. Shared cognition and emotion are ramifications of shared social identity. To date however, too little research has examined how these psychological dimensions affect and are affected by deliberation and the decisions made during the deliberative process. This investigation aims to examine the ways in which reasoning (cognition) and emotion are interwoven during deliberation and how this interaction may be mediated by shared identity in ways that are consistent with the ideal of autonomy.

More specifically, we aimed to investigate cognitive shifts, represented by understandings of democracy, as a function of deliberation and how these shifts may be influenced by group dynamics and emotion. If it is true that deliberation gives rise to group identity and, consequently, to shared cognition and group emotions, then the outcome of deliberation, in this case discourses of democracy, cannot be attributed solely to individual cognitive reasoning. Because deliberation is a democratic process where all participants have an equal voice and where listening and respect for the other is elementary, changes in understandings of reality are likely to occur (Niemeyer, 2011) and in ways in line with defining features of group identity. Deliberative processes are the antithesis of manipulation and prediction of outcomes is therefore (ideally) more open-ended rather than directional. Consequently, this investigation is more exploratory rather than probative.

In the following sections we seek to demonstrate that the case study example (the Australian Citizens' Parliament) was broadly deliberative in the ideal sense, insofar as it involved the exchange of arguments in ways that can be characterised as respectful and reciprocal (willingness to engage with and respond to alternative views), and that it involved a transformative effect. We then move on to demonstrate that a good part of this effect involved the establishment of a group identity of a kind that facilitated the ascendency of deliberative ideals and that affect and emotion played a role in this process.

Research Overview

The present research was conducted as a longitudinal project covering four stages of data collection (see Figure 1). The main event—the Australia Citizen's Parliament (ACP)—was a large scale deliberative undertaking that brought together 152 Australians from each federal electorate in Australia.[2] The participants deliberated on the question, "How can Australia's

[2] In order for the sample to be representative of the whole Australia we aimed at having one participant from each of the 150 federal electorates. Initially, 9653 invitations were sent to citizens across electorates. From these 2762 citizens registered their interest to participate in the ACP. The final 152 (2 extra due to oversampling) participants were drawn from this sample using stratified random sampling. This technique was used in order to obtain a representative sample in terms of gender, age, education and indigenous/non-indigenous citizens. This sampling resulted in 75 men and 77 women, the ages varied between 18 and 90 years. Of these, four participants identified as indigenous. Most participants were between 45 and 54 years old. Education ranged from compulsory education to post-graduation. Most participants had either TAFE (training and further education) or a bachelor's degree (see Newdemocracy, 2009 for further details).

political system be strengthened to serve us better?"[3] The CPs task at the final ACP meeting was to discuss this issue and come up with recommendations to the Government that were consensually agreed upon. These recommendations were then delivered to the Prime Minister's Cabinet (see Newdemocracy, 2009 appendices 5 and 6 for procedural details).

The final meeting of the ACP was held in Old Parliament House in Australia's capital city, Canberra. Deliberations were moderated by facilitators that made sure that norms for deliberation were followed. The facilitators themselves were mainly professionally and were carefully briefed in respect to their roles in the lead up to the event (see Hartz-Karp & Carson, 2009; Newdemocracy, 2009).

At the outset of the ACP the ground rules for discussion were presented to the group prior to the beginning of deliberations proper. These were: *speak openly and honestly; listen carefully to what others have to say; treat everyone with respect; keep comments brief and to the point of the question; stay on task; if you need to take a break, do so.*[4] Previous research on the ACP suggests that participants followed these general guidelines (Hartz-Karp, et al., 2010).

Stage 1	**Acceptance to participate**
• Q Sort	
• Demographic questions	
Stage 2	**Regional meetings**
• Q Sort	
• Demographic questions	
Stage 3	**Pre-deliberation**
• Q Sort	
• Questionnaire (demographics; questions pertaining to online	
Stage 4	**Post-deliberation**
• Q Sort	
• Questionnaire (demographics; questions pertaining to ACP deliberation)	

Figure 1. Stages of data collection.

The ACP project served as the backdrop against which the data was collected. We made use of both content analyses and quantitative data analyses. The four-day deliberations were recorded and later transcribed. Qualitative results were transformed into quantitative format where possible. We also used Q methodology, which is both a qualitative and quantitative method and is normally deployed to study people's subjectivity (Brown, 1993; Dziopa & Ahern, 2011). The Q method was used to extract the narratives (i.e., understandings) about Australian democracy, which served as benchmarks for tracking the positions of participants during different stages of the deliberative process using statistical methods. We also asked a question that pertained to identification with the deliberative group. We were also interested to know participants' perceptions of the deliberation. To this end we used a questionnaire with questions pertaining to the deliberation.

[3] This question was formulated as a result of six "World Café" events that were conducted prior to the start of the ACP project.

[4] This approach contrasts with that used for smaller scale deliberative processes where the ground rules for the process were primarily established by the group, thus further facilitating the establishment of deliberative norms within the group as a whole as well as group identity.

Method

Several methods were deployed to analyse the relationships between deliberation and understandings of democracy, affect, and group identity (see Figure 2).



Figure 2. Schematic illustration of relationships between deliberation and understandings of democracy, identity, and affect and the methods used to analyse these relationships.

Establishing the "Deliberativeness" of the ACP Process

To access whether participants understood the process as deliberative we used a direct measure (Black, Burkhalter, Gastil, & Stromer-Galley, 2010) in the form of a questionnaire , which was administered after deliberations had ended. The quality of deliberation can be measured directly or indirectly. Whereas direct measures assess aspects contained in the theoretical definition of deliberation, indirect measures study variables that give an approximate indication of the quality of deliberation. Direct measures make use of different kinds of text analysis or survey-like methods. Whereas text analyses provide a more thorough scrutiny of the quality of deliberation it also is extremely time consuming. Survey-like methods through participant assessments offer a more straightforward alternative to the evaluation of deliberation (Black, et al., 2010). Following Burkhalter, Gastil, and Kelshaw's (2002) general conception of public deliberation, we used a survey-based approach to measure whether participants believed the ACP followed certain deliberative norms. The questions were: 1) *How often do you believe participants just stated positions without justifying them?;* 2) *How often do you believe participants truly expressed what was on their mind?;* 3) *How often do you feel that other participants treated you with respect?;* 4) *When participants expressed views that were different from your own, how often did you consider what they had to say?* These questions were answered on a 5-point scale from 1 (*Never*) to 5 (*Almost always*).

Benchmarking the Main Perspectives on Australian Democracy Using Q Methodology

We employed Q methodology to measure participants' understandings of democracy in relation to the Australian political system. To do this the Q method uses inverted factor analysis: correlating the Q sorts provided by participants, as opposed to variables, using factor extraction (in this case Principal Components) to find the array of responses to statements (factor) that account for the highest possible variance among the Q sorts, and so on for the residual variation

for the remaining factors. A subset of four of the resulting factors were then transformed using varimax rotation to produce orthogonal positions that collectively accounted for most of the perspectives of participants (for a complete description of Q method see Brown, 1980).

The approach has the advantage of reducing many participants' viewpoints to a few factors. Each factor represents an ideal type position or how a hypothetical individual, whose beliefs perfectly match the factor in question, would sort the statements. The factors are represented in the form of narratives drawn from the underlying statements.

Q methodology begins by drawing a sample of statements relevant to the issue or phenomenon under study to implement as a *Q sort*. A Q sort represents an individual's reaction to a set of statements about a particular domain—in this case, Australian democracy; it is therefore a model of the entirety of an individual's orientation to that domain. We gathered statements from actual dialogue using a wide range of sources—including old and new media, World Cafes conducted by the New Democracy Foundation in the lead up to the ACP, and a report from the 2020 Summit (a gathering run by the Australian government in 2008). We drew a sample of 48 statements from this larger pool to comprise a manageable number for use in the Q sort at the ACP. These items were selected to encompass the broadest possible range of potential orientations toward Australian politics. Some examples are: *We live in a great democracy; I don't want to be in a place where only a minority's viewpoint gets the right to say what's going to happen; The party system is the main obstruction to accountable politics.* The set included statements originally used in a prior study of Australian discourses of democracy (see Dryzek, 1994).

A longitudinal design conducted over four stages was applied at which participants completed the Q sort. The first Q sort was done as soon as participants consented to be selected; the second (Stage 2) at regional meetings conducted around Australia in the lead up to the main event. The third and fourth Q sorts (stage 3 and 4) were obtained respectively immediately before and immediately after the main meeting of the ACP. The number of Q sorts at each stage varied considerably. Forty-eight individuals provided usable Q sorts at all four stages of the research, and it is these individuals who we examined in this study.

The Q sorts were obtained by asking participants, at each stage, to order the 48 statements into a set of eleven categories along a scale from -5 (*Most disagree*) to +5 (*Most agree*). In doing so, they assigned a score to each statement with the requirement that their ratings approximate a normal distribution (i.e., fewer statements can be placed in the extreme categories). Change was also assessed through two direct questions asking whether participants had changed their view about how Australian democracy can be strengthened and, if so, when did they change.

Analysing the Impact of Deliberation on Group Identity and Affect

We conducted content analysis to investigate group identification. Transcripts from the four-day deliberation were screened for sentences that included "we", "us" and "our" with reference to *Australians*; *Australians versus politicians*; *Australians versus other nationalities*; *Australians from a specific state*; and *Citizen Parliamentarians*. We then counted the frequency with which these we-identities were referred to over the four days of deliberations.

We also used a proxy measure of group identification at stage three, just before deliberation begun, with a single item reading: "I saw myself as an important part of the Citizens Parliament being held here in Canberra." This statement was answered on a scale from 1(*Strongly disagree*) to 5 (*Strongly agree).*

We also conducted content and frequency analyses of expressions of emotionality (positive and negative) based on the transcripts. Two independent judges coded the transcripts of day four, for each table, in relation to the categories *deliberation, organisation,* and *social.* When there was disagreement the judges discussed the statements in order to reach agreement. Most of the disagreements were cases in which one judge coded follow-up reinforcement statements whereas the other judge coded only the main statement. Other cases were such where one judge categorised a statement as *organisation* whereas the other categorised it as *deliberation.*

Results

Was the Event Deliberative?

To examine whether the normative framework for deliberation had been followed we first examined whether participants perceived the deliberative norms to be in operation. We conducted an analysis of the means for responses pertaining to these norms. The means in Table 1 indicate that participants in general perceived that the discussions followed basic deliberative norms. The means are all well above or below the midpoint, indicating that the normative framework for discussion was effective. This also indicates that a form of deliberation was in place.

Table 1
Participants Perception of the Deliberative Norms (SDs within Parenthesis) Measured on a 1-5 Likert-Type Scale

Deliberative norm	*M (SD)*
1. How often do you believe participants just stated positions without justifying them?	2.21 (.86)
2. How often do you believe participants expressed what was on their mind?	4.13 (.90)
3. How often do you feel that other participants treated you with respect?	4.77 (.61)
4. When participants expressed views that were different from your own, how often did you consider what they had to say?	4.40 (.79)

These results are substantiated by participants' own spontaneous evaluations of the deliberative process as illustrated in the following quotations:

- "This event was just great and the interaction amongst people so powerful. It shows the process works. My heartfelt thank you to all the people involved."
- "This process was the most enlightening experience I have been involved in. I would never have believed that so many views & opinions could have been discussed openly & fairly with such a diverse group."
- "A very powerful project, which proved to me people listen, people grow & people care with passion. Well done to ALL involved."
- "Our discussion went in peace and tolerable manner unlike what we normally see in TV debate. Everyone has respect to each other."

What Understandings of Democracy Emerged? Did they Change? And How?

To extract the narratives (understandings) of the Australian democratic system we conducted inverted factor analysis. Four factors emerged that contain the main narratives. These are named Factor A, Factor B, Factor C, and Factor D.

Factor A: Liberal Democratic Contentment

Narrative: Our democracy, although not perfect, is meaningful and works well, as governments do share power with citizens. We have a well-functioning party system, in keeping with the disagreement that is a necessary part of democracy. So there is no need to be cynical about politics. The only slight problem is that money is too influential. Our system is able to change in the face of any problems that do arise. Citizens have a responsibility to pay attention and vote, and should be able to exercise influence.

Factor B: Moralistic Leadership

Narrative: While our system works reasonably well, we deserve better government than what we currently have. While we are all equal when we vote, money is too influential in politics. The key to better government is leadership that puts into practice moral principles such as those found in the bible. A robust democracy would feature decency, active citizenship, debate across different views, all motivated *by what individuals think is in the public interest, not their private interests.*

Factor C: Anxious Majoritarianism.

Narrative: While we live in a democracy, it is distorted by the influence of the rich, corporations, vested interests, and the power of various minorities who have too big a say. There is no reason for the interests of minorities and women to be promoted. Informed voting is really important: this is where the majority can express itself, and there is no need for citizens to be active beyond voting.

Factor D: Discontented Participationists

Narrative: Our political system is remote, closed, and inflexible. We are not well served by a conflictual party system that serves itself rather than the voters, where corporate lobbyists and vested interests have too much say. Politicians don't listen at all between elections. We deserve much better government than what we have. It would be great if we could vote on specific issues, not just on party platforms. Politics should involve much more in the way of citizen participation so that legitimate disagreements can be discussed and policies can be influenced.

Longitudinal Changes in Understandings of Democracy

To track changes in understandings of democracy we first analysed the average loadings for each factor to determine patterns among factors. As displayed in Figure 1, all factors had relatively low mean loadings at stage one (*r*s between .17 and .24) with participants loading similarly in factors A and D. This pattern changed however markedly from stage one to stage four, with factor A emerging as the strongest one, culminating at stage four. Because factor loadings across time were relatively low for all factors except for factor A, the following analyses focus on this factor only.



Figure 3. Average factor loadings for understandings of democracy across the four Stages

We conducted repeated measures ANOVA for factor A[5]. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment showed a significant difference in factor loadings between stage one and stages two (p = .01) and four (p = .001). Significant differences were also found between stages two and four (p = .001) and stages three and four (p = .001). The means displayed in Figure 3 show that there was a significant increase in factor loadings from stage one to stage two. No changes occurred from stage two to three but loadings increased again significantly from stage three to four. In other words, there was a significant change in understandings of democracy from pre- to post-deliberation suggesting that deliberation had an effect on participants' preferences for the kind of democratic system.

There was a question pertaining to whether participants had changed their perspective since the initial invitation in relation to how the Australian political system could be changed and, if so, when. To this question 92% answered that they had changed of which 88% responded that the change occurred during the deliberations in Canberra. Thus self-assessed change corroborates measured longitudinal changes.

Qualitative data provides some evidence that the reason why preferences changed in the direction of contentment was due to the information deliberators received from the panel of experts as illustrated in the following quotation from a participant: "Well I think all of those people probably made most of the participants here realise that we do live in a very privileged political environment. We're very fortunate."

Ancillary Outcomes

Whereas the above results show that there was a change in understandings of democracy, other personal changes occurred that are worthy of mentioning. Qualitative data shows that the

[5] Mauchly's tests showed that the assumption of sphericity was not violated, $\chi^2(5) = 4.18$, $p = .52$. The multivariate test using Wilks' statistic showed a significant difference in factor loadings across stages, $\lambda = .35$, $F(3, 45) = 27.59$, $p = .001$, ${}_p\eta^2 = .65$. This result was further supported by within-subjects tests using Greenhouse-Geisser correction, $F(2.83, 133.12) = 35.09$, $p = .001$, ${}_p\eta^2 = .43$.

deliberative process engendered deep changes at the personal level that are not tapped by the Q sort, as is evidenced in the following testimonies:

- "I came with fairly strong but (I now know) narrow views & very passionate. I leave knowing that my passion has changed focus and strengthened in a very positive was [sic]. My views now incorporate the width of a nation, not just my own little patch! Thank you to ALL involved - a wonderful success!"
- "I am going home with an open mind on Parliament processes."
- "Overall a very personal journey, one of self-development. Thank you."
- "Please continue the great job you started. It changed me and I'm sure lots of others."
- "A wonderful learning experience. Life - changing. An honour to have worked alongside such caring, committed people, including ALL those involved"
- "I am so impressed with the process & the outcomes & proposals. I was genuinely surprised & encouraged by the quality of the document & the dynamic at each table. I now need some time to process the experience & determine where to from here - I have been impacted significantly."
- "The Indigenous guy, Aboriginal guy. think that his presentation was, for me an unexpected highlight … 'cause I don't have much sympathy for Indigenous people … I thought he made me rethink. He kicked something along in me that I didn't think was possible ... I think most of them are lazy bums and undeserving, but he made me rethink my generalisation."

Emergent We-identity

To test whether identity as CP emerged we used content analysis to identify statements containing "we" "us" and "our." We computed the percentage that each identity was referred to from the total number across identities for each day[6] (see Table 2). Because the most salient social identities were "we Australians" and "we CPs", we computed a paired samples *t*-test to examine differences between these identities. The test showed no significant differences between Australian and CP identity. These two identities are in fact intertwined as CPs were at the forum to represent Australians in general, we therefore combined these two identities into one and compared with the other identities, also combined into one. We labelled these identities "Australian/CP" and "various identities" respectively. Having done this we computed another paired samples *t*-test. The results showed a significant difference between Australian/CP identity and various identities, $t(3) = 8.42$, $p = .004$. The result thus shows that identity as Australian/CP was more salient across the four days of deliberation than other social identities (see Table 2). The emergence of collective identity is best encapsulated within the following statement by a CP: "I heard about a 'we' and an 'us'... if I'm sitting here, which I am, then I think I'm becoming part of the 'us'."

We also computed a Pearson correlation between the item that taped into identification with the CP group and Factor A at stage four (A_4) to examine whether identification was associated with preference for contentment. The results showed a significant positive correlation between these variables, $r(30) = .37$, $p = .02$. The more participants felt that they were part of the ACP the higher they loaded on Factor A_4.

[6] It needs to be noted that the results in Table 2 partially depend on the topics discussed each day. On day one and two the topics were more conducive to elicit identity expressions than the topics on day three and four. However, these conditions were equal for all different identities and therefore we assume that they affected the results in a similar manner.

Table 2
Frequency with which Each Identity Was Referred to over the Four-day Deliberation (Raw numbers within Parenthesis)

We-identity	*Day 1*	*Day 2*	*Day 3*	*Day 4*	*Total*
We Australians	43%	40%	44%	24%	37.75%
	(51)	(98)	(19)	(13)	(181)
We Australians vs. politicians	14%	6%	2%	2%	6%
	(17)	(15)	(1)	(13)	(46)
We Australian people vs. other	0. 80%	4%	2%	0%	1.7%
nationalities	(1)	(10)	(1)	(0)	(12)
We indigenous Australians	5%	3%	0%	0%	4%
	(6)	(8)	(0)	(0)	(14)
We Australians from a particular state	68%	4%	0%	2%	1.92%
	(2)	(10)	(0)	(1)	(13)
We Citizen Parliamentarians	35%	42%	51%	72%	50%
	(42)	(103)	(22)	(39)	(206)

Affective Dimensions of Deliberation

Two independent judges content analysed the transcripts in relation to positive and negative emotional expressions regarding deliberative, organisational and social aspects of the ACP. This resulted in one judge categorising more statements than the other. The universe of statements was therefore not exactly the same for both judges and we could, consequently, not compute the Cohen's *kappa,* which is the statistic typically used to measure inter-rater agreement (Howell, 1992). Instead, we computed point-biserial correlations between the judges using the number of statements coded by each judge for each table. To be sure that there was agreement regarding which statements that were coded, we also computed the number of statements that both judges attributed to each table in each category. Following this, for each category and for each table we divided the amount of agreed statements by the total of statements coded for each table. For example, if the total number of coded statements in one table was 20 but only 18 statements were equally coded by both judges the percentage of agreement was 18/20 = 90% agreement for that table. We then computed a similar calculation but using the total number of coded statements for each category. For example, if the total agreement was 89 in one category and the total number of statements attributed to that category was 96 the agreement would be 89/96 = 92.7% agreement. Through this procedure we obtained a percentage of the total inter-rater agreement.

Following these procedures, for positive statements in the category deliberation the correlation between the judges was $r(21) = .95$, $p = .001$, for organisation it was $r(21) = .91$, $p = .001$, and for the social aspect it was $r(21) = .76$, $p = .001$. The agreement with which the judges coded statements in the same categories was 94.8% for deliberation, 76.5% for organisation and 80.6% for the social aspect.

Following these calculations we computed a MANOVA using a 3 (category: deliberation, organisation, social) × 2 (judge: judge 1, judge 2) design with category as independent variable and the number of statements attributed to each category by each judge as dependent variable. This procedure allowed us to examine whether there were any differences in the number of

coded statements between the categories.[7] Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment showed that both judges coded significantly (*p*s = .001) more statements in the category deliberation (*M*s = 13 and 12.90, *SD*s = 6.35 and 6.18) than in organisation (*M*s = 3.86 and 3.00, *SD*s = 4.33 and 3.86) and social (*M*s = 3.19 and 2.81, *SD*s = 2.34 and 2.25). There were no significant differences between the categories organisation and social for any of the judges.

For the negative statements the point-biserial correlation for the agreement between the judges was significantly positive for the category deliberation, $r(21) = .98$, $p = .001$, and for the category organisation, $r(21) = .95$, $p = .001$. Because negative statements about the social aspect were found solely for table 1, for which both judges identified three negative statements, we did not compute any analyses of agreement for this category. The percentage of agreement for deliberation was 87.6% and for organisation it was 83%.

We conducted two separate *t*-tests, one for each judge, to examine whether there were differences between the number of statements coded for each category. These tests showed no significant statistical difference. The number of negative statements coded were similar between the categories deliberation and organisation.

We then conducted separate paired samples *t*-tests for each judge to examine whether there were differences between positive and negative coded statements for the categories deliberation and organisation. These computations showed that for deliberation both judges coded significantly [$t(20) = 6.65$, $p = 001$, $r = .55$, and $t(20) = 5.15$, $p = 001$, $r = .43$)] more positive (*M*s = 13.00 and 12.90, *SD*s = 6.36 and 6.18) than negative statements (*M*s = 5.05 and 5.76, *SD*s = 4.95 and 5.68). For the category organisation, although the judges tended to code less positive (*M*s = 3.85 and 3.00, *SD*s = 4.34 and 3.86) than negative statements (*M*s = 6.71 and 5.62, *SD*s = 4.85 and 4.43), the difference was not statistically significant. For the social aspect both judges coded significantly more [$t(20) = 5.73$, $p = 001$, $r = .94$, and $t(20) = 5.10$, $p = 001$, $r = .72$)] positive (*M*s = 3.19 and 2.81, *SD*s = 2.34 and 2.25) than negative statements (*M*s = .14 and .14, *SD*s = .66 and .65).

These results indicate that the ACP event induced overwhelmingly positive emotions during the four-day main event. A qualitative illustration of this result is found in a transcript excerpt uttered by a CP: "To find people in a forum such as this, we're all trying to be positive..." An aspect that does not crystallise in quantitative expositions but that transpires in qualitative ones is that whereas the positive aspects were more straightforwardly positive as for example: "[I] found the enthusiasm overwhelming", "finding of common ground was really positive", the negative ones were more indirect as this one expressing disappointment: "…the original intent of some things put forward got lost when it got put together." In addition, whereas most negative expressions were in relation to the organisation, the positive ones were with regards to deliberation.

Discussion

Emerging theoretical and empirical research on deliberative theory is moving away from a strict emphasis on individual rationality to a conception of deliberation where affect and collective aspects of the person are seen as having a legitimate place (e.g., Dryzek, 2000; Rosenberg, 2007). This move is backed up by research in social psychology and social neuroscience, where the connections between reason, emotion, and identity have been

[7] There was a significant multivariate effect of category, $\lambda = .45$, $F(4, 118) = 14.62$, $p = .001$, ${}_p\eta^2 = .33$. Univariate tests showed a significant difference between the number of statements attributed to each category by both judges, $F(2, 60) = 29.26$, $p = .001$, ${}_p\eta^2 = .49$, and $F(2, 60) = 36.12$, $p = .001$, ${}_p\eta^2 = .55$.

demonstrated (Damasio, 1994; Forgas, 1995; Haslam, et al., 1998). Whereas conceptually, deliberative theory has become more integrative by taking in the whole person rather than just the thinking person, this integration in empirical work has lagged behind. This investigation attempted to address this lacuna by examining these psychological aspects within the frame of a deliberative event. As part of the Australian Citizens Parliament, a deliberative forum where participants were charged to provide recommendations for how the Australian democratic system can be strengthened, we investigated how deliberative events may lead to changes in understanding (reasoning) of public issues—in the present case, Australian democracy—, create shared identity, and how these aspects may be intertwined with emotion.

We first ascertained whether the event was indeed deliberative. Our findings indicate that this was the case. We also found that understandings of democracy arose and changed during the course of the ACP. There were indications of high levels of group identification and of positive affect. These findings were supported by a multitude of quantitative and qualitative indices.

Deliberation and Reasoning

Beginning with the discourses of democracy, four distinct understandings of Australian democracy emerged and then shifted during the deliberative process. However, rather than shifting in different directions, participants in general, moved toward one single understanding of democracy. Given the premise that deliberative capacity existed it is interesting and somewhat puzzling to find that the most prominent understanding of democracy was one of contentment with the status quo. Ideally, deliberation encourages critical thinking and a broader understanding of the issue at hand (Dryzek, 2000). Instead, rather than criticism, the ACP seems to have fostered acceptance and, rather than having an emancipatory effect (Niemeyer, 2011), it generated conformity of thinking. It is therefore pertinent to understand why, when given the chance to be critical about the order of things, participants showed a tendency toward preserving that very same order.

We suspect that a strong reason to why this was the case lays in the deliberative question itself: "How can we *strengthen* the Australian democratic system to serve us better?" there is a positive charge to this formulation that implies that the system already is good. Participants may have reasoned that if the system is good why should we change it? Such phrasing is symptomatic of a positive framing (Curato, Dryzek, Batalha, & Niemeyer, in preparation) that may have discouraged a more critical stance from the part of CPs and instead instigated positive emotionality. In line with affirmative design participants may have been trying to be positive rather than critical as this utterance by a CP exemplifies: "…we're all trying to be positive...." From a deliberative perspective this is arguably bad news as there may not have been enough space for dissent and contestation.

Deliberation and Affect

Our findings show that participants had an overwhelming positive experience which was emotionally laden. Participants reported feeling "empowered", "honoured", "overwhelmed", "thrilled", and "grateful". This clearly shows that the deliberative process made people feel good. Moreover, the testimonials about personal transformations also provide strong evidence of the positive emotional climate that permeated the forum.

The data format does not allow the examination of a direct association between the quantitative index of political preferences with the qualitative indicators of affect. We can

therefore not assess directly whether affect influenced preferences. However, we suspect that the positive framing of the forum together with the positive feelings it induced in participants had a ripple effect leading to a general positive assessment of the political system.

Deliberation and Identity

Deliberative processes are the ideal setting for identity creation. Our findings corroborate those of Hartz-Karp and colleagues (Hartz-Karp, et al., 2010) in that there is clear evidence that a collective identity emerged as a result of deliberation. Moreover, the results also suggest that there was a relationship between the feeling of being part of the CP group and preference for the status quo. This is a curious finding and may be explained in light of the social identity perspective. This perspective proposes that a group member's beliefs, values, behaviours are, to a great extent, guided by the norms that define the group (Turner, et al., 1987). Assuming that the ACP forum was framed by an affirmative design, it is likely that the group identity came to be defined by a norm of being positive rather than critical, which "channelled" the participants in the direction of contentment.

Although our results cannot substantiate this, it is likely that the deliberative design created defining features for the collective identity and gave rise to positive affect. These latter factors had a mutual effect on each other and mediated the effect of deliberation on preference of political system, as represented in Figure 4.



Figure 4. Conceptual representation of the relationship between deliberation, collective identity, affect and political preference.

Is This an Example of Good Deliberation? Could it be Better?

Our findings suggest that positive affect played too big a part in deliberation, both in the form of design and resultant group affect. Whereas we set out to investigate the role that affect may play in deliberation and suggested that it is a necessary part of it, taken together our results suggest that pervasive positivity may be detrimental to deliberation. They indicate that a positive attitude that permeates all aspects of the forum is likely to hinder participants to take a more critical stance to the issues being discussed. If participants are encouraged to be critical (within the boundaries of mutual respect), and if, consequently, a critical attitude becomes part of the defining identity of the group, it is conceivable that there would be greater freedom for preferences to develop in directions other than status quo and convergence.

Our findings have contributed to advancing deliberative theory by demonstrating that emotion and collective identity are important components of the deliberative process and should therefore be incorporated in a conceptual definition of deliberation. Whereas this is true, features of the results also admonish us to take good care when designing deliberative events so that these features serve deliberation rather than undermine it. Thus, whereas a conceptual definition

should account for emotion and identity it also needs to delineate the ideal contours for these dimensions.

Tentatively, we propose that deliberative practice that is more critical and less positively biased should ideally provide a space for (1) identity creation defined by a critical stance (deliberative identity), (2) "critical" emotion in the sense of providing epistemic reasons for a particular position (O'Neill, 2002), (3) reasoning informed by the newly formed deliberative identity, and critical emotion. Whereas this hypothesis seems plausible we acknowledge that only empirical work can substantiate it. Ideally, theory and practice inform each other in an iterative relationship. We suggest that further empirical work testing these ideas is necessary in order to further advance deliberative theory.

Some Shortcomings

Although our data provides good evidence for the necessity of taking into account the role of collective identity and emotion in deliberation when designing deliberative forums, there are some shortcomings that prevent us from drawing bolder conclusions. The most pertinent is the problem of having two distinct data sets, one with quantitative and another with qualitative data, which were not always compatible with each other in terms of conducting statistical analyses drawing on both sets of data. This drawback prevented us from analysing more in depth the association of deliberation, political preferences, identity and emotion. Another shortcoming is the lack of longitudinal data for all variables. Whereas there was Q data for all the four stages this was not the case for the identity and affect factors. Thus, whereas we can show that collective identity and emotion emerged as a result of the deliberative forum, we cannot demonstrate with confidence that these psychological dimensions affected political preferences. If anything, these proclivities explicitly point at how the importance of good design cannot be underestimated.

In trying to answer the question posited in the Introduction of whether emotion works against achieving deliberative outcomes or whether there is a proper role for emotion, based on our findings we suggest that emotion can work in both ways. An important caveat is that if deliberation is too strongly carried according to affirmative design there is a risk that rather than being instrumental, emotion may bias participants in a positive and less critical direction. Although even then some deliberative goals are achieved. The testimonials from CPs attest to the deep personal changes occurred, with citizens feeling more enlightened about political issues and more empowered. Provided that this is true it means that citizens are better equipped to make democratic decisions. Such an outcome can, however, be maximised if deliberations have a critical focus rather than an affirmative one. Using emotion to understand reasons may contribute to an even greater personal emancipation as the person, more critically, can use their affect to grasp an issue.

Conclusion

Although deliberation takes place within a normative framework, it is an open process, rather than an experimental enterprise. It is therefore not possible or desirable to control for unexpected factors to influence the outcomes. However, if we want to better understand the role that group emotion and group identity play in deliberative reasoning it is necessary to account for these factors in future deliberative practice. Within the field of psychology there are reliable instruments in place to operationalize group identification, as well as emotional states. These can without difficulty be adapted to a deliberative endeavour. Importantly, to understand the

impact of such factors on the deliberative processes it is crucial that research is conducted longitudinally. Only then can we, not only understand how these factors influence the outcomes of deliberation, but also how deliberative practice can capitalise on the positive aspects of this influence to achieve the best outcomes, at the same time as avoiding the pitfalls potentially inherent in them. A way of doing this is by motivating participants toward a critical stance (cf. Redlawsk, 2002). Whereas our findings do not tease out the psychological dynamics involved in deliberation, we believe that psychology, and in particular social psychology, has an important role to play in understanding and promoting good deliberative practice, a practice that takes advantage of the whole person rather than just the reasoning individual. Such an approach will be better equipped to meet the ideals delineated by deliberative theory.

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